20 January 2026

Thai Political Milestones, no. 6:
‘Shutdown Bangkok’


Bluesky

Thailand’s politics had been polarised for almost a decade by 2013, between the yellow-shirt and red-shirt movements. Yingluck Shinawatra managed the impossible, by bringing both sides together in a common cause — though they were united against one of her Pheu Thai government’s key policies, a blanket amnesty for those accused of political crimes. The proposed amnesty would have given immunity to Abhisit Vejjajiva over his role in the deadly crackdown on red-shirt protesters in 2010, though the bill was widely perceived as a cover to exonerate Yingluck’s brother Thaksin of his corruption charges.

The amnesty bill was approved by parliament on 1st November 2013, thanks to Pheu Thai’s majority in the House of Representatives, though the vote was held at 4am, in a misguided attempt to pass it without drawing attention to the legislation. Protests against the amnesty took place in Bangkok, and the bill was unanimously rejected by the Senate, on 11th November 2013.

Whistle Rebellion

At the same time, on 20th November 2013, the Constitutional Court rejected an attempt by Pheu Thai to amend the constitution and return to an entirely elected Senate. (Under the previous 1997 constitution, the Senate had become fully democratic for the first time, though the subsequent constitution drafted after the 2006 coup created a half-elected and half-appointed Senate.)

In a highly unusual and provocative step, Pheu Thai publicly rejected the court’s verdict, and even called for the impeachment of the five judges who voted against the government. Yingluck ultimately withdrew the proposed amendment, and dropped all plans for an amnesty, though these concessions emboldened the anti-government protesters to increase their campaign, calling for the eradication of what they called the Thaksin regime.

Matichon Weekly

People’s Democratic Reform Committee


Mass demonstrations began on the weekend of 23rd and 24th November 2013, when around 100,000 protesters gathered at Democracy Monument. Suthep Thaugsuban, a senior figure in the opposition Democrat Party, resigned as an MP to lead a new protest group, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee. The PDRC briefly occupied the offices of several government ministries on 25th November 2013.

PDRC protesters carried whistles instead of the hand-clappers used in previous demonstrations, though in other respects they followed the yellow-shirt playbook. Their street protests caused maximum disruption in Bangkok, provoking a political crisis, and creating the conditions for a military coup.

In 2010, when Suthep was in government and the red-shirt rallies were at their height, Suthep said: “if they violate the laws, such as blocking roads and intruding into government offices, we will have to disperse the protesters.” But, three years later, he was using precisely the tactics that he had previously condemned.

Matichon Weekly Lips

On 9th December 2013, all Democrat Party MPs resigned from parliament and the PDRC led around 160,000 people in a march to Government House. Yingluck dissolved parliament and called a general election for 2nd February 2014, though the Democrats announced that they would boycott the vote.

Registration for the election took place at the Bangkok Youth Centre stadium, and the PDRC began one of its biggest rallies there on 22nd December 2013. After four days, on Boxing Day, the police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters, and a police officer was killed.

Suthep escalated his protests, announcing a ‘Shutdown Bangkok’ campaign that began on 13th January 2014, designed to cause gridlock in the capital city and sabotage the election. Yingluck declared a state of emergency on 22nd January 2014, and four days later the PDRC blocked access to polling stations to prevent early voting in the election.


On election day, 11% of polling stations were closed due to PDRC protests, and voting was cancelled in nine provinces. On the eve of the election, a lone gunman shot four pro-democracy demonstrators at Lak Si in Bangkok. (His M16 rifle was concealed in a Kolk popcorn bag, which became a tasteless fashion accessory among some PDRC members.)

After months of disruption, riot police began attempting to reclaim some of the blockaded buildings and roads in Bangkok. On 18th February 2014, four protesters and a police officer were killed at Phan Fah when protesters attacked the police with grenades and gunfire, and the police responded with live ammunition. Suthep finally ended his shutdown on 3rd March 2014.


The 2014 Coup


On 20th March 2014, army chief Prayut Chan-o-cha announced that the military had taken over control of national security. In a televised broadcast, he sought to reassure the public: “We urge people not to panic. Please carry on your daily activities as usual. The invocation of martial law is not a coup d’etat

Two days later, Prayut led the National Council for Peace and Order in a military coup against the Pheu Thai government. He was appointed prime minister on 21st August 2014, a role he held for nine years.

Thai Political Milestones:

27 July 2025

Bangkok Joyride 5:
Dancing with Death


Bangkok Joyride 5

The fifth episode of Ing K.’s epic documentary Bangkok Joyride (บางกอกจอยไรด์), subtitled Dancing with Death (รำวงพญายม), had its premiere at Cinema Oasis in Bangkok yesterday. The series, shot on Ing’s iPhone, is an exhaustive record of the street protests organised by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee against Yingluck Shinawatra’s government, and part five documents the period from 9th to 26th February 2014.

Dancing with Death begins in the same festive spirit as the earlier episodes, as Ing films a 9th February 2014 protest march in real time and picks out colourful characters among the demonstrators. The rally was a fundraiser for farmers affected by Yingluck’s disastrous rice subsidy scheme, which resulted in vast stockpiles of unsold rice and delays in compensating the farmers who supplied it.

The atmosphere of the protests became much darker on 18th February 2014, when riot police armed with tear gas and rubber bullets attempted to reclaim land occupied by the PDRC. At Phan Fah near Democracy Monument, protesters attacked the police with grenades and gunfire, and the police responded with live ammunition. Four protesters and a police officer were killed, and Ing covers the aftermath of this political violence, filming the funeral of a victim. The film also includes a horrific Facebook video clip showing a protester being fatally shot.

Bangkok Joyride 5

Parts one and two of the documentary, How We Became Superheroes (เมื่อเราเป็นยอดมนุษย์) and Shutdown Bangkok (ชัตดาวน์ประเทศไทย), covered the buildup to the PDRC’s campaign in 2013 and the initial demonstrations in Bangkok. Part three, Singing at Funerals (เพลงแห่ศพ), covered the intensification of the protests in January 2014, when the PDRC caused gridlock in downtown Bangkok. Part four, Becoming One (เป็นหนึ่งเดียว), covered the 2nd February 2014 election, which the PDRC sabotaged.

The PDRC campaign took place more than a decade ago, but — given the cyclical nature of Thai politics — there are parallels with current events. Another Shinawatra family member, Yingluck’s niece Paetongtarn, is now in office, and there was a demonstration against her at Victory Monument in Bangkok on 28th June. The PDRC’s protests paved the way for a coup in 2014, and a headline in a recent issue of The Economist magazine (12th July) asked: “Is Thailand heading for another coup?”


Thai Cinema Uncensored discusses other Thai films that comment on the PDRC (all of which, unlike Bangkok Joyride, are critical of the protesters). These include Neti Wichiansaen’s Democracy after Death (ประชาธิปไตยหลังความตาย), Sorayos Prapapan’s Auntie Maam Has Never Had a Passport (ดาวอินดี้), Watcharapol Saisongkroh’s This Film Has Been Invalid [sic], Joaquim Niamtubtim’s Shut Sound: Lao Duang Duen, and three films by Chulayarnnon Siriphol: 100 Times Reproduction of Democracy (การผลิตซ้ำประชาธิปไตยให้กลายเป็นของแท้), Myth of Modernity, and Here Comes the Democrat Party (ประชาธิปัตย์มาแล้ว). There is also a music video from 2019, #2557 (#๒๕๕๗) by Deadrabbit, featuring footage of the PDRC protests. (2557 in the Buddhist Era is 2014.)

01 June 2023

Who? สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ
(‘who is Suthep Thaugsuban?’)


Who?

Who? สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ (‘who is Suthep Thaugsuban?’) was published in 2014, at the height of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee protests led by Suthep Thaugsuban. Suthep, a veteran MP, attempted to bring Bangkok to a standstill, laying the groundwork for a military coup. His PDRC also blocked candidates from registering for the 2014 election, and sabotaged the election itself.

The comic book Who? สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ is an idealised biography of Suthep, presenting him as a role model for children. If he seems a completely unsuitable subject for such a comic, remember that his anti-democratic protest movement was supported by many middle-class Bangkokians, and their children were presumably the book’s target audience. (Of course, the comic whitewashes Suthep’s reputation for corruption, such as the 1995 land-reform scandal, portraying him as a victim of false accusations.)

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, against whom Suthep campaigned relentlessly, was also involved in a vanity project similar to Who? สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ. Thaksin commissioned a series of seven animated cartoons, ตาดูดาวเท้าติดดิน (‘looking at the stars, feet on the ground’), which gave an equally hagiographic account of his life story.

02 May 2023

Beyond Red and Yellow:
A Thai Politics Primer



Thailand has been in a state of political crisis for almost twenty years: a cycle of protests and military interventions, dominated by a populist politician (Thaksin Shinawatra, who won an election landslide in 2001) and a military dictator (Prayut Chan-o-cha, who led a coup in 2014 and remains Prime Minister). A new exhibition — Red, Yellow and Beyond — provides a photographic record of the last two decades, and the following is a concise guide to the major political events of this turbulent and polarising period.

Thaksin won an unprecedented second election victory in 2005, though protests against his administration began when he sold a stake in his Shin Corp. company to Singaporean company Temasek in 2006. His government had increased the legal limit on foreign ownership of telecom firms to enable the Shin sale, and changed the tax code to avoid paying any duty on the deal, a manipulation of the law for personal gain. The anti-Thaksin campaign disrupted the 2006 election, which was invalidated by the Constitutional Court.

Matichon Weekly

The 2006 Coup and the People Power Party


Thaksin was deposed by a military coup in 2006. The junta drafted a new constitution, which was endorsed in a referendum. Whereas the previous 1997 ‘people’s charter’ had created a democratically elected Senate, under the new constitution only 50% of senators were elected and the remainder were appointed. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2007, and he was later convicted of corruption.

If the coup had been designed to eradicate Thaksin’s political influence, it was unsuccessful, as he formed the People Power Party as a proxy for Thai Rak Thai. The PPP won the 2007 election, though its leader Samak Sundaravej was disqualified from politics by the Constitutional Court on a technicality in 2008. Thaksin installed his brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, as PPP leader to replace Samak, leading to a revival of the yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy anti-Thaksin campaign. The PAD occupied Bangkok’s airports and government buildings, and the Constitutional Court dissolved the governing PPP to appease the PAD protesters.

Matichon Weekly

The Democrats and Pheu Thai


The court’s verdict created a power vacuum, and the military brokered a coalition between the opposition parties, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Democrats, to form an unelected government. This prompted violent protests by the pro-Thaksin, red-shirt United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship in 2009. Thaksin’s assets were frozen by the Supreme Court at the start of 2010, triggering UDD protest rallies. UDD protesters were brutally massacred by the military, and almost 100 people were killed.

Pheu Thai, another of Thaksin’s proxy parties, won the 2011 election, and Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became Prime Minister. Yingluck announced plans for an amnesty that would have quashed Thaksin’s corruption conviction. This sparked protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, which — following the PAD playbook — quickly gathered steam. The PDRC blocked candidates from registering for the 2014 election, and sabotaged the election itself. The election was nullified by the Constitutional Court, and a rerun was scheduled for later that year. Yingluck was removed as PM by the Constitutional Court after an investigation into nepotism charges (and subsequently fined, impeached, and convicted of dereliction of dutyin absentia — in relation to her government’s rice subsidy scheme).

Matichon Weekly

The 2014 Coup


After Yingluck’s removal from office in 2014, the military imposed martial law and launched another coup two days later. Progressive politicians, including Yingluck, were detained, and protests were suppressed. After coup leader Prayut was appointed Prime Minister, sporadic anti-government demonstrations by young protesters began. Martial law, which had deterred widespread protests, was repealed in 2015. The junta rewrote the constitution in 2016, increasing proportional representation (to prevent another populist landslide) and reverting to a fully appointed Senate. The new charter, which was endorsed in a referendum, also gave senators a vote on who would become prime minister.

After numerous delays, an election was finally held in 2019. Another of Thaksin’s proxy parties, Thai Raksa Chart, audaciously nominated Princess Ubolratana as its candidate for prime minister in the election. On the same day, King Rama X issued a statement forbidding her from running for office. After this dramatic royal intervention, Thai Raksa Chart was dissolved by the Constitutional Court. Although Pheu Thai won the most seats in the election, Prayut was reinstated as Prime Minister.

Matichon Weekly

From Future Forward to Move Forward


The current student-led protest movement began in 2020, following the dissolution of the Future Forward party by the Constitutional Court. Protest rallies organised by Free Youth and the United Front of Thammasat and Demonstration were held at Democracy Monument and Thammasat University, and riot police used water cannon to disperse protesters at Siam Square. In 2021, more radical protest groups such as REDEM (a rebranding of Free Youth) and Thalufah organised regular demonstrations near Victory Monument, and riot police began firing rubber bullets at the demonstrators.

Future Forward, previously led by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, was relaunched as Move Forward. As a popular alternative to the Thaksin-affiliated Pheu Thai, it may split the opposition vote in this year’s upcoming election, though a progressive coalition is also a possibility. Move Forward leader Pita Limjaroenrat is currently being investigated for ownership of shares in iTV, even though the TV station ceased operations in 2007. (Thanathorn was disqualified as an MP for ownership of media shares in 2019.)

A constitutional amendment in 2021 slightly reduced the impact of proportional representation on the election results; this may benefit larger parties such as Pheu Thai. A few months before the election, Prayut joined a new party, United Thai Nation, after a rift between him and his deputy, Prawit Wongsuwon (rumoured to be the mastermind behind the 2014 coup).

27 February 2023

Fear


Fear Primitive

Manit Sriwanichpoom’s photography exhibition Fear (กลัว), held in Bangkok and Singapore in 2016, documented the volatile political atmosphere in Thailand prior to the 2014 coup, and the initial period following the junta’s takeover. The excellent accompanying catalogue remains a valuable record of a timely yet politically sensitive exhibition.

Discussing the title, Fear, in a short interview published in the catalogue, Manit explains that “today’s great fear is over something we can’t discuss aloud.” This has echoes of Taiki Sakpisit’s short film The Age of Anxiety (รอ ๑๐), which addressed the fear of the death of King Rama IX in the twilight of his reign. The link is reinforced by the catalogue’s cover image: a photograph of an 1868 solar eclipse predicted by King Rama IV shortly before his death.

Manit bravely included large-scale portraits of National Council of Peace and Order and National Legislative Assembly members (the coup leaders and the legislators they appointed), pixellated to obscure their identities. Though their individuality is denied, their uniforms are still visible, presenting them en masse as a faceless — and therefore inhuman — authoritarian entity. Similarly, screengrabs of technical glitches during coup leader Prayut Chan-o-cha’s first televised Return Happiness to the People (คืนความสุข ให้คนในชาติ) speech highlight the vulnerability behind the propaganda façade.

Although Manit satirised the junta’s populist propaganda, he was also critical of the government overthrown by the coup, and he endorsed the People’s Democratic Reform Committee protesters who laid the groundwork for the military takeover. The catalogue describes the legacy of former PM Yingluck Shinawatra, subject of another photo series, as something “we now long to forget.” Introducing photographs of police vehicles vandalised beyond repair by the PDRC, the catalogue even claims: “these cars were not destroyed; merely overturned and coloured... They could still be saved to run upright again.”

The most powerful work in the Fear exhibition was the short video Primitive (ป่าเถื่อน), a montage of sixty-five photographs of bloodstains on the base of Bangkok’s Democracy Monument, accompanied by plaintive cello music. These dark red smears — one of which appears on the back cover of the catalogue — are grisly reminders of an attack on PDRC protesters on 15th May 2014, when three people were killed by unknown assailants heavily armed with M79 grenade launchers and M16 automatic rifles.

05 April 2019

Bangkok Joyride IV

Bangkok Joyride IV
Ing K.'s epic documentary Bangkok Joyride (บางกอกจอยไรด์) continues with its fourth instalment, Becoming One (เป็นหนึ่งเดียว), playing now at Cinema Oasis in Bangkok. The series, shot on Ing's iPhone, is an exhaustive record of the PDRC campaign against Yingluck Shinawatra. In part four, a protester claims that Yingluck's brother, Thaksin, is "worse than Hitler", echoing an equally hyperbolic quote from Ing's earlier documentary, Citizen Juling (พลเมืองจูหลิง): "We talk of Hitler... But villagers, all citizens nowadays fear PM Thaksin 10 times more."

Bangkok Joyride covered the early stages of the PDRC's campaign in parts one and two, How We Became Superheroes (เมื่อเราเป็นยอดมนุษย์) and Shutdown Bangkok (ชัตดาวน์ประเทศไทย). Part three, Singing at Funerals (เพลงแห่ศพ), covered the buildup to the 2014 election. Part four covers the protests from 26th January to 8th February 2014, including the 2nd February election.

The PDRC sabotaged the election, blockading polling stations to prevent voting. (It was ultimately invalidated, and the military launched a coup before another poll could take place.) Despite this, Bangkok Joyride celebrates the protesters, and in parts three and four Ing herself appears on stage at PDRC rallies. She can also be heard from behind the camera, wishing the protesters luck; in part four, she tells a demonstrator: "We fight the exact same battle."

In part three, Ing accused the mainstream Western media of pro-Thaksin bias, and this conspiracy theory is expanded in part four when she harangues the BBC's Bangkok correspondent, Jonathan Head: "How do you sleep at night, Mr Head?" Bangkok Joyride's fetishisation of national symbols also continues in part four: protesters are filmed while standing for the national anthem, not once but five times.

Part five, Dancing with Death (รำวงพญายม), will be released later this year. Meanwhile, Neti Wichiansaen's documentary Democracy after Death (ประชาธิปไตยหลังความตาย), which highlights the PDRC's anti-democratic agenda, provides an effective counterpoint to Bangkok Joyride. The short films This Film Has Been Invalid [sic], Auntie Maam Has Never Had a Passport (ดาวอินดี้), Shut Sound, Myth of Modernity, and Here Comes the Democrat Party (ประชาธิปัตย์มาแล้ว) also include footage of PDRC demonstrations.

01 August 2018

Bangkok Joyride 3:
Singing at Funerals


Bangkok Joyride 3

The third part of Ing K.’s epic documentary Bangkok Joyride (บางกอกจอยไรด์) opened last week at Cinema Oasis. Chapter three, Singing at Funerals (เพลงแห่ศพ), covers the PDRC demonstrations from 15th to 26th January 2014, when Suthep Thaugsuban escalated the protest with his ‘Shutdown Bangkok’ campaign. The forthcoming chapter four, Becoming One (เป็นหนึ่งเดียว), will cover the PDRC’s sabotaging of the 2014 general election.

Singing at Funerals follows the same format as the first two chapters, How We Became Superheroes (เมื่อเราเป็นยอดมนุษย์) and Shutdown Bangkok (ชัตดาวน์ประเทศไทย). Filmed on Ing’s iPhone, it features excerpts from PDRC rallies (including speeches by Vasan Sitthiket and Ing herself) and extensive footage of street processions. The coverage ultimately becomes excessive: the camera follows Suthep for half an hour as he collects donations from an endless line of protesters. There are also numerous shots of Thai flags being waved, and this fetishisation of the national flag has been a consistent feature of Bangkok Joyride.

16 April 2018

About Heroes

Bangkok Joyride I
Bangkok Joyride II
Whistle Rebellion
Cinema Oasis, the arthouse cinema that opened last month in Bangkok, will begin a season of political documentaries this month, after the Songkran holiday. The About Heroes season features Bangkok Joyride (บางกอกจอยไรด์), a documentary directed by Ing K. The film, divided into two chapters, is a record of the PDRC's protests in 2013 and 2014 against former prime ministers Yingluck and Thaksin Shinawatra.

Chapter one, How We Became Superheroes (เมื่อเราเป็นยอดมนุษย์), covers the first stage of the protest, when Suthep Thaugsuban campaigned against a proposed amnesty bill. The amnesty was a blatant attempt to exonerate Thaksin of his corruption charges, and was unanimously rejected by the Senate. The film also features extended clips of a parliamentary no-confidence debate against Yingluck. Emboldened after defeating the amnesty bill, Suthep called for the dissolution of parliament and the establishment of an appointed government.

Chapter two of the documentary, Shutdown Bangkok (ชัตดาวน์ประเทศไทย), covers the escalation of the PDRC's protests. Following the playbook of the PAD, the PDRC shut down major roads in central Bangkok and occupied government buildings, yet were unopposed by the police. The anti-democratic nature of the protest was revealed when the PDRC sabotaged the 2014 general election, which may be included in the forthcoming third episode, Singing at Funerals (เพลงแห่ศพ). The PDRC protests are also documented in four books of photographs: สู่ฝันฟ้าวันใหม่ by Takerng Somsup (published by Bluesky), Whistle Rebellion: Chronicles of Thailand’s Street Protest in the Year 2013–2014 (ปฏิวัตินกหวีด บันทึกภาพเหตุการณ์การชุมนุมปี พ.ศ. 2556–2557), มวล..มหาประชาชน สู่ ประชาภิวัฒน์ บันทึกเสี้ยวหนึ่งของประวัติศาสตร์การเมืองไทย, and บันทึกมวลมหาประชาชน.

Ing has also directed the banned films Shakespeare Must Die (เชคสเปียร์ต้องตาย) and My Teacher Eats Biscuits (คนกราบหมา). Her documentary Censor Must Die (เซ็นเซอร์ต้องตาย) was not banned as, according to section 27(1) of the Film and Video Act, "films of news events" are exempt from classification.

When I interviewed Ing in 2016, she said: "this ruling has set a marvellous legal precedent for all documentary films. I'm going to use this ruling to exempt my next film (another cinéma vérité documentary, called Bangkok Joyride) from the censorship process. Then it's a matter of finding a cinema." She solved that problem by building Cinema Oasis.

Citing the "news events" exemption, she didn't submit Bangkok Joyride to the censors, which explains why she was able to include a protester saying "Long live the King" in chapter one and a snippet of the royal anthem in chapter two. Boundary (ฟ้าตํ่าแผ่นดินสูง) was muted to remove a chant of "Long live the King", which was regarded as politicisation of the monarchy, and the royal anthem was cut from Soi Cowboy (ซอยคาวบอย) for commercialisation of the monarchy.

01 March 2014

“We will stop closing Bangkok...”


Matichon Weekly

Suthep Thaugsuban has announced that his ‘Shutdown Bangkok’ campaign, which has disrupted traffic in the city since 13th January, will finally end on 3rd March. He pledged to dismantle his blockades at major intersections, and consolidate his protest camp at Lumpini Park: “We will stop closing Bangkok and give every intersection back to Bangkokians. We will stop closing Bangkok from Monday.”

However, Buddha Issara, a Suthep ally who is leading a protest site at Chaengwattana, has refused to withdraw from the area. (Buddha Issara, a Buddhist monk, has also been accused of extortion, after protesting at businesses associated with Thaksin Shinawatra and insisting on payment before agreeing to leave: last week, he demanded ฿120,000 from the SC Park Hotel, which is part of the Shinawatra Group.)

Suthep led People’s Democratic Reform Committee protests against the proposed amnesty bill last year, and successfully pressured the government into dropping the proposal, though the protests continued to escalate. Protesters blocked the registration of candidates for some constituencies before the general election, and obstructed polling stations to prevent advanced voting. On election day, Suthep’s PDRC forced the closure of 11% of polling stations, denying millions of citizens their right to vote.

The decision to end the shutdown is an acknowledgement that the PDRC has been unsuccessful in its plan to bring down the government. Suthep caused maximum disruption on the streets (as the yellow-shirts did in 2006 and 2008), and the Democrat Party boycotted the election (as it did in 2006), recreating the circumstances that led to the coup in the hope that the army would intervene again. However, this time the Court ruled that the election was legal, and army chief Prayut Chan-o-cha called on both sides to avoid confrontation.

Suthep’s public support is also dwindling, and attendance at his rallies has been declining sharply. There were also concerns about public safety, after several deaths from grenades and gunfire aimed at some protest sites: last weekend, four people, including three young children, died after attacks on protesters in Ratchaprasong (close to Siam Square in Bangkok) and Trat (a province on the Cambodian border).

19 February 2014

“This case is over...”


Democracy Monument

A general election was held as scheduled on 2nd February, though the government continues to face street protests and judicial interventions. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra met the Election Commission of Thailand on 28th January, after the Constitutional Court decreed that the election could be legally postponed. While the ECT called for a delay, Yingluck argued that there was no legal precedent for an extension beyond the sixty-day period stipulated by the constitution.

People’s Democratic Reform Committee protesters attempted to prevent voting on election day, just as they had when advanced voting took place on 26th January. 89% of polling stations opened successfully, though voting was cancelled in nine provinces due to PDRC disruption and lack of Election Commission officials. Kitti Eaksangkul was almost strangled by a PDRC protester as he attempted to enter a polling station, and a photograph of the assault was reproduced in newspapers around the world. On the day before the election, a lone gunman shot four pro-democracy demonstrators at Lak Si in Bangkok. (His M16 rifle was concealed in a Kolk popcorn bag, which has since become a tasteless fashion accessory among some PDRC members.)

There is still confusion surrounding twenty-eight constituencies in which no candidates could register for the election, marking another disagreement between the government and the Election Commission. The government maintains that the existing royal decree can be applied to the new round of registrations and by-elections, though the ECT insists that a new decree is required. This is uncharted legal territory, a further sign of the stalemate created by the cycle of protests in Bangkok. As with the election postponement, the ECT will ask the Constitutional Court to adjudicate on the need for a royal decree.

Following a petition from the Democrat Party (which boycotted the election) seeking an annulment of the election, the Constitutional Court ruled last week that the election was legal. This was an unexpected victory for the government, as the court had annulled the 2006 election (which the Democrats also boycotted).

The Democrats have previously accused the government of disrespecting Constitutional Court judgements (after the court rejected Yingluck’s bill to restore a fully-elected Senate), thus the Democrat lawyer was careful not to challenge the court’s validation of the election. The lawyer, Wiratana Kalayasiri, said: “This case is over. But if the government does anything wrong again, we will make another complaint.”

The PDRC protesters are still occupying several intersections in Bangkok, though they closed two of their camps at the start of this month. The protest sites are almost deserted during the daytime, though more protesters arrive in the evenings. (In contrast, on 22nd December last year, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators protested at locations around Bangkok.) Some sites now resemble street markets rather than political demonstrations. Also, PDRC leader Suthep Thaugsuban has failed four times to appear at the Criminal Court to answer murder charges relating to the 2010 military massacre.

More than a month after Suthep’s ‘Shutdown Bangkok’ protest escalation, the police have begun an attempt at reclaiming some of the blockaded buildings and roads. Yesterday, four protesters and a police officer were killed at Phan Fah near Democracy Monument. Protesters attacked the police with grenades and gunfire, and the police responded with live ammunition.

Today, the Civil Court ruled that, while the government is within its rights to declare a state of emergency, it has no authority to disperse the protesters. This judgement is a contradiction, as political demonstrations are forbidden during a state of emergency. It also legitimises the illegal protest movement and represents another judicial undermining of the government’s authority. Furthermore, the ruling is in contrast to the Civil Court’s decision of 5th April 2010, when it decreed that the government did have the authority to disperse United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship protesters.

Yesterday, the National Anti-Corruption Commission unanimously decided to bring formal charges against Yingluck for her role in the government’s rice subsidy scheme. This could potentially lead to her impeachment, if she were found guilty. Impeachment would require a three-fifths majority vote in the Senate, though Yingluck would be suspended from duty pending the Senate’s vote.

In 2011, the government agreed to pay farmers up to 50% above the market rate for their rice, intending to withhold it from the world market and thus drive up the price. The result, however, was that other countries such as India and Vietnam increased their rice exports, the government was left with vast stockpiles of rice that it could not sell, and therefore it could not pay the farmers for the rice they had supplied.

Despite initially dismissing the rice farmers as uneducated peasants, the PDRC have now embraced the farmers as victims of the government, and are raising money to pay them. (Suthep accused the government of buying votes with this and other policies, though he is now employing the same strategy by paying the rice farmers himself.)

11 December 2013

People’s Democratic Reform Committee


Bluesky

Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has announced that she will dissolve parliament, and has scheduled a general election for 2nd February next year. After her announcement, the opposition Democrat Party resigned en masse: all of their MPs quit parliament simultaneously, in a dramatic rejection of the democratic process.

Yingluck was responding to pressure from Suthep Thaugsuban, who has been leading street protests in Bangkok for the past month. A fortnight ago, Suthep invaded and occupied the Finance Ministry, in an attempt to destabilise the government. Four people were killed in clashes between students supporting Suthep and United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship members on their way to a pro-government rally. Police have used tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters who were attempting to break into various government buildings, though a temporary truce was called to mark the King’s birthday on 5th December.

Suthep was formerly a Democrat MP, though he resigned in order to take his protest onto the streets. Ironically, when Suthep was Deputy Prime Minister in 2010, he and former PM Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered the army to use live ammunition against UDD protesters. (Abhisit and Suthep have both been charged with murder following the 2010 military massacre.) In fact, in 2010 Suthep said: “if they violate the laws, such as blocking roads and intruding into government offices, we will have to disperse the protesters.” Now the tables have turned, and Suthep is leading his own protesters, using precisely the tactics that he condemned in 2010.

The protest started last month, when the government passed a bill that would have granted an amnesty to anyone charged with political offences since the 2006 coup. The amnesty, a blatant attempt to facilitate former PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s return to Thailand, was deeply unpopular with the public. (Thaksin has been living in self-imposed exile in Dubai since he was charged with corruption in 2008.)

Opposition to the amnesty briefly united both sides of Thailand’s political divide. The red-shirts opposed it because it would have absolved Abhisit and Suthep of their responsibility for the 2010 massacre. The yellow-shirts were against it because it would have annulled Thaksin’s corruption charge. Suthep began campaigning against the amnesty, and up to 100,000 people gathered at Democracy Monument to support him on 23rd and 24th November. (Democracy Monument was also the scene of a red-shirt protest in March 2010.)

Yingluck caved in to public opinion and dropped the amnesty bill. It was also unanimously rejected by the Senate. However, Suthep did not stop his protest; in fact, he stepped up his campaign and called for the complete eradication of ‘the Thaksin regime’. He has since led thousands of protesters in occupying several government ministries in Bangkok. Last week, his supporters marched to the offices of Thailand’s terrestrial TV stations. Intimidated by the protesters, most channels broadcast a live speech by Suthep, in which he called for a national strike. (He made a similar appeal last month, though that was unsuccessful.)

The government’s proposal to amend the constitution is another reason for the current protests. Under the 1997 constitution, widely regarded as Thailand’s most democratic charter, the Senate became fully elected for the first time. However, after the coup, the 2007 constitution reverted to a partially appointed Senate. Yingluck had sought to amend article 117 of the constitution, and thus restore the fully elected Senate, however the Constitutional Court ruled that any such amendment was unlawful.

The Constitutional Court has a history of politically-motivated judgements. In 2006, it dissolved Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party though exonerated the Democrats of all charges. In 2008, it ordered Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to resign for hosting a TV cookery show. Later that year, it dissolved the People Power Party in what has been called a judicial coup.

Suthep’s goals, and his deadlines for achieving them, are both highly fluid. He sets a new deadline every few days, and when it passes he simply postpones it. He initially gave the government until 11th November to cancel the amnesty bill. (They didn’t.) Then he declared that 1st December would be ‘Victory Day’. (It wasn’t.) He then issued a two-day deadline for Yingluck to resign before 3rd December. (She didn’t.) Then he announced that yesterday would be the ‘final battle’ after which he would surrender to the police. (It wasn’t, and he didn’t.) At the weekend, he gave Yingluck another deadline of twenty-four hours to resign. (She didn’t.) And he gave the police twelve hours to stop guarding Government House. (They didn’t.)

Emboldened after the amnesty bill was cancelled, he has now demanded not only the resignation of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of parliament, but the establishment of an entirely new political system. He has formed a People’s Democratic Reform Committee to govern the country instead of an elected parliament. He has also called for a royally-appointed prime minister, though the King has previously and unequivocally ruled this out. The PDRC’s name is therefore somewhat ironic, as it is clearly undemocratic. (The People’s Democratic Reform Committee sounds familiar: the organisers of the 2006 coup called themselves the Council for Democratic Reform.)

Suthep’s concept of an appointed government is similar to the People’s Alliance for Democracy’s ‘new politics’ policy, which called for a 70% appointed parliament and a royally-appointed prime minister. (The PAD is another undemocratic group with an ironic name.) Suthep’s protest tactics (occupying ministries) also resemble the PAD’s invasions of Government House and Suvarnabhumi airport in 2008. A warrant has been issued for Suthep’s arrest, though there has been no attempt to detain him. Even if convicted, he is unlikely to face jail: the PAD leaders have still not been prosecuted, some five years after their brazen takeover of Suvarnabhumi.

Like the PAD, Suthep is doing his best to provoke the army into staging another coup, though army chief Prayut Chan-o-cha has so far managed to resist temptation. Abuse of power was used as a justification for the 2006 coup against Thaksin, though corruption is endemic throughout Thai politics. In another irony, Suthep is campaigning against the corrupt Thaksin regime, yet Suthep also has a reputation for corruption: he illegally distributed farmland as Agriculture Minister in 1995, and he was disqualified as an MP in 2009 after violating the constitution.

In resigning as an MP and organising disruptive protests, Suthep has shown that he prefers mob rule to parliamentary democracy. (PDRC protesters carry whistles instead of the hand-clappers used in previous demonstrations, though in other respects they are following the PAD playbook.) Suthep and the PDRC represent only a minority of the electorate, as they consist largely of middle-class Bangkokians. They are vastly out-numbered by Thailand’s rural poor, most of whom are pro-Thaksin.

Thaksin and his proxies have won every election since 2001. If a new election were called today, it’s very likely that Yingluck would win again, hence Suthep’s plan to replace elections with an appointed council. The Democrats have lost five elections in a row, but instead of reforming their party to make it more electable, they prefer to blame the democratic system itself. Unable to accept Thaksin’s popularity with the electorate, his opponents consistently resort to undemocratic alternatives. Hopefully the election will go ahead as scheduled next year, though if the Democrats boycott it (as they did in 2006) they may trigger another judicial or military intervention.